Tolstoy’s argument: realism and the history of science by Psillos, Stathis
Tolstoy’s	argument:	realism	and	the	history	of	science	
	
Stathis	Psillos		1.	In	his	intervention	to	the	‘bankruptcy	of	science	debate’,	which	raged	in	Paris	in	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	Leo	Tolstoy	was	one	of	the	first	to	use	the	past	record	of	science	as	a	weapon	against	current	science.1	Among	his	various	observations	in	his	essay	“The	Non-Acting”,	published	in	French	in	August	1893,	the	following	stands	out:		 Lastly,	does	not	each	year	produce	its	new	scientific	discoveries,	which	after	astonishing	the	boobies	of	the	whole	world	and	bringing	fame	and	fortune	to	the	inventors,	are	eventually	admitted	to	be	ridiculous	mistakes	even	by	those	who	promulgated	them?	(...)	Unless	then	our	century	forms	an	exception	(which	is	a	supposition	we	have	no	right	to	make),	it	needs	no	great	boldness	to	conclude	by	analogy	that	among	the	kinds	of	knowledge	occupying	the	attention	of	our	learned	men	and	called	science,	there	must	necessarily	be	some	which	will	be	regarded	by	our	descendants	much	as	we	now	regard	the	rhetoric	of	the	ancients	and	the	scholasticism	of	the	Middle	Ages	(1904,105)		Toltsoy	couldn’t	put	this	history-fed	pessimism	more	clearly	and	elegantly.	Given	the	past	record	of	failures	of	scientific	theories,	which	emerged	triumphantly	only	to	be	abandoned	at	a	later	stage,	we	are	justified	to	expect	“by	analogy”	that	at	least	some	of	the	presently	accepted	theories	will	have	the	same	fate.	Unless	we	are	entitled	to	suppose	that	currently	accepted	theories	“form	an	exception”;	a	supposition	which	“we	have	no	right	to	make”.		In	his	preface	to	the	Russian	translation	of	the	English	essayist	Edward	Carpenter's	‘Modern	Science:	a	Criticism’	(published	in	1885),	Tolstoy	made	clear	that	his	main	concern	with	a	conception	of	science	which	takes	it	to	aim	to	explain	“things	near	and	important	to	us	by	things	more	remote	and	indifferent”	(1904,	220).		2.	Note	the	sophistication	of	Tolstoy’s	argument.	It	is	not	inductive.	It	does	not	conclude	that	all	current	scientific	theories	will	be	abandoned;	nor	that	most	of	them	will	be	abandoned;	not	even	that	it	is	more	likely	than	not	that	all	or	most	of	them	will	be	abandoned.	Its	conclusion	is	modest:	some	of	presently	accepted	theories	will	have	the	fate	of	those	past	theories	that	once	dominated	the	scene	but	subsequently	were	abandoned.	This	conclusion	is	grounded	on	an	analogy;	and	it	is	as	strong	as	the	basis	for	the	analogy.	Hence,	it	is	subject	to	the	proviso	that	the	current	ways	to	do	science	“form	no	exception”.	Because	of	its	modesty,	the	argument	is	very	pressing.	Unless	some	kind	of	privilege	is	granted	to	current	science	or	unless	there	are	ways	to	identify	the	current	culprits—those	
current	theories	which	will	have	the	fate	of	past	abandoned	ones—Tolstoy’s	point	is	compelling:	we	cannot	simply	assume	that	as	science	grows,	we	get	to	know	more	about	the	world.			3.	Tolstoy	was	very	much	among	the	‘people	of	the	world’	whom	Henri	Poincaré	had	in	mind	when	he	said,	in	his	keynote	address	to	the	1900	International	Congress	of	Physics:																																																										1	I	am	telling	the	philosophical	story	of	the	bankruptcy	debate	in	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zwEYZNKeCpQ	
	 The	people	of	world	[les	gens	du	monde]	are	struck	to	see	how	ephemeral	scientific	theories	are.	After	some	years	of	prosperity,	they	see	them	successively	abandoned;	they	see	ruins	accumulated	on	ruins;	they	predict	that	the	theories	in	vogue	today	will	in	a	short	time	succumb	in	their	turn,	and	they	conclude	that	they	are	absolutely	in	vain.	This	is	what	they	call	the	bankruptcy	of	science	(1900,	14).		Buy	he	added:		 Their	scepticism	is	superficial;	they	do	not	understand	none	of	the	aim	and	the	role	of	scientific	theories;	without	this	they	would	understand	that	ruins	can	still	be	good	for	something.			Poincaré’s	considered	reply	was	that	the	history	of	science	shows	that	there	is	continuity	at	the	level	of	mathematical	equations,	which	he	took	them	to	express	theoretical	relations	among	things.	Far	from	being	bankrupt,	science	offers	some	knowledge	of	the	world,	as	this	is	certified	by	the	historical	record	of	diachronically	invariant	mathematical	equations;	and	hence	of	theoretical	relations.	The	history	of	the	development	of	physics,	Poincaré	stressed,	shows	that	“new	relations	are	continually	being	discovered	between	objects	which	seemed	destined	to	remain	forever	unconnected”	(1900,	23).		
	 This	kind	of	response	answers	Tolstoy’s	pessimism	by	presenting	a	strategy	that	neutralises	his	argument.	The	answer	is:	look	at	what	is	retained	when	theories	change;	these	invariant	elements	capture	what	we	can	legitimately	describe	as	scientific	knowledge	of	the	world.		4.	For	various	reasons	that	had	to	do	with	Poincaré’s	relationism,	he	thought	that	that	the	neutralising	strategy	was	bound	to	vindicate	only	knowledge	of	the	relational	structure	of	the	world	and	not	of	the	intrinsic	properties	of	things—the	‘things	themselves’	[chose	elles-memes]	as	he	put	it	(see	my	2014	for	the	details).	Ludwig	Boltzmann	did	not	carry	this	philosophical	baggage.	He	was	committed	to	atomism	and	thought	that	the	atomic	theory	of	matter	was,	by	and	large,	correct.	(A	view	that	Poincare	came	to	accept	a	bit	before	he	died	based	on	the	theoretical	and	experimental	work	of	Jean	Perrin	on	the	molecular	basis	of	Brownian	motion—see	my	2011	for	details).		 It’s	unlikely	that	Boltzmann	knew	about	Tolstoy	and	the	‘bankruptcy	of	science	debate’	in	Paris,	but	he	certainly	knew	of	the	‘bankruptcy	of	materialism’	debate	that	had	been	initiated	by	Wilhelm	Ostwald’s	paper	‘Die	Überwindung	des	Wissenschaftlichen	Materialismus’,	which	was	delivered	in	1895	to	the	annual	conference	of	the	Society	of	German	Naturalists	and	Physicians	in	Lubeck.	Boltzmann	was	the	respondent.	Ostwald’s	paper	was	quickly	translated	into	French	(La	Déroute	de	l’Atomisme	Contemporain’,	Revue	Générale	des	Sciences	
Pures	et	Appliquées,	(1895),	21,	pp.953-958)	and	English	(cf.	Ostwald	1896).2		Part	of	Ostwald’s	argument	against	the	“mechanics	of	atoms”	was	historical:	all	hitherto	attempts	to	offer	a	mechanical	account	of	optical	phenomena	had	failed	(cf.	1896,	593).	But	what	bothered	Boltzmann	more	was	the	view	of	the	so-																																																								2	Ostwald’s	piece	was	linked	to	the	‘bankruptcy	of	science’	debate	by	the	French	physicist	Leon	‘Marcel’	Brillouin	(1854-1948),	who	published	a	pointed	reply	to	Ostwald	in	the	very	same	year	in	the	journal	Revue	Générale	des	Sciences	Pures	et	Appliquées,	titled	‘Pour	la	Matiere’.	His	piece	started	with	the	observation:	“After	the	bankruptcy	of	science,	the	bankruptcy	of	atomism!”		
called	“phenomenologists”	(who,	as	he	noted,	included	the	early	Max	Planck).	These,	according	to	Boltzmann,	were	opposed	to	the	explanation	of	the	visible	in	terms	of	the	invisible.	According	to	the	phenomenologists,	the	aim	of	science	was	to	“write	down	for	every	group	of	phenomena	the	equations	by	means	of	which	their	behaviour	could	be	quantitatively	calculated”	(Boltzmann	1901,	249).	The	theoretical	hypotheses	from	which	the	equations	had	been	deduced	were	taken	to	be	the	scaffolding	that	was	thrown	away	after	the	right	equations	had	been	arrived	at.	For	phenomenologists,	then,	explanatory	hypotheses	of	the	visible	in	terms	of	the	invisible	were	neither	unnecessary	nor	useless—rather	they	had	a	heuristic	value	only:	they	lead	to	stable	(differential)	equations	that	describe	the	behavior	of	the	phenomena	as	they	are	experienced.		According	to	Boltzmann,	a	key	motivation	for	this	attitude	towards	explanatory	scientific	theories	was	the	“historical	principle”,	viz.,	that	hypotheses	are	essentially	insecure	because	they	tend	to	be	abandoned	and	replaced	by	others,	“totally	different”	ones.	As	he	put	it:			 frequently	opinions	which	are	held	in	the	highest	esteem	have	been	supplanted	within	a	very	short	space	of	time	by	totally	different	theories;	nay,	even	as	St.	Remigius	the	heathens,	so	now	they	[the	phenomenologists]	exhorted	the	theoretical	physicists	to	consign	to	the	flames	the	idols	that	but	a	moment	previously	they	had	worshipped	(1901,	252-253).				Against	this	“historical	principle”,	which	was	a	bit	more	radical	than	Tolstoy’s	Boltzmann	argued	that	despite	the	presence	of	“revolutions”	in	science,	there	is	enough	continuity	in	theory	change	to	warrant	the	claim	that	some	“achievements	may	possibly	remain	the	possession	of	science	for	all	time,	though	in	a	modified	and	perfected	form”	(1901,	253).			5.	So	Boltzmann	too,	independently	of	Poincaré,	argued	that	the	answer	to	the	historical	challenge	is	to	look	for	continuity	in	theory	change.	But	unlike	Poincaré,	Boltzmann	did	not	restrict	the	criterion	of	invariance	to	relations	only.	In	fact,	if	the	historical	principle	is	correct	at	all,	it	cuts	also	against	the	equations	of	the	phenomenologists.	For	unless	these	very	equations	remain	invariant	through	theory-change,	there	should	be	no	warrant	for	taking	them	to	be	accurate	descriptions	of	worldly	relations.			 Boltzmann	went	on	to	make	a	seemingly	puzzling	point:			 Indeed,	by	the	very	historical	principle	in	question	a	definitive	victory	for	the	energeticians	and	phenomenologists	would	seem	to	be	impossible,	since	their	defeat	would	be	immediately	required	by	the	fact	of	their	success	(1901,	253).			To	see	what	he	has	in	mind,	let	us	stress	his	further	point	that	the	sole	way	that	phenomenologists	had	to	arrive	at	the	desired	differential	equations	was	by	relying	on	the	basic	assumptions	of	the	atomic	theory.	These	equations,	Boltzmann	noted,	are	“totally	devoid	of	meaning	without	the	assumption	of	a	very	large	number	of	individual	entities”,	that	is,	without	assuming	that	matter	is	not	continuous.	And	he	added:			 An	unthinking	use	of	mathematical	symbols	only	could	ever	have	led	us	to	separate	differential	equations	from	atomistic	conceptions.	As	soon	as	it	is	clearly	seen	that	the	phenomenologists,	under	the	veil	of	their	differential	equations,	also	proceed	from	
atomistic	entities,	which	they	are	obliged	to	conceive	differently	for	every	group	of	phenomena	and	as	endowed	now	with	these	and	now	with	those	complicated	properties,	the	need	of	a	simplified	and	uniform	atomistic	doctrine	will	soon	be	felt	again	(1901,	252).		In	other	words,	the	very	construction	of	the	differential	equations	of	the	phenomenologists	requires	commitment	to	atomistic	assumptions.	Hence,	the	phenomenologists	are	not	merely	disingenuous	when	they	jettison	the	atomistic	assumptions	after	the	relevant	differential	equations	have	been	arrived	at.	As	Boltzmann	noted	in	his	seemingly	puzzling	remark,	their	move	is	self-undermining	in	light	of	the	historical	principle	that	they	themselves	rely	on	to	motivate	abandoning	the	atomistic	hypothesis	and	to	defend	the	withdrawal	to	the	level	of	mathematical	equations.	The	reason	is	simple:	their	success	(viz.,	that	they	have	the	right	equations)	would	lead	to	their	defeat	since	the	very	theory	that	led	to	this	success	would	fall	foul	of	the	historical	principle:	it	would	have	to	be	abandoned.	That’s	exactly	what	Boltzmann	means	when	he	says	that	the	phenomenologists’	“defeat	would	be	immediately	required	by	the	fact	of	their	success”.		6.	The	point	here	is	not	to	classify	Boltzmann	as	a	realist—though	I	think	he	was.	The	point	is	that	Boltzmann	saw	clearly	that	the	historical	challenge—Tolstoy’s	argument;	the	phenomenologists’	principle—is	not	compelling,	though	illuminating,	provided	that	parts	of	past	and	abandoned	theories	have	been	shown	to	be	“stable	and	established”	(1901,	250).	But	it	is	also	significant	that	he	also	made	clear	that	though	showing	continuity-in-theory-change	is	important	and	indispensable	in	rebutting	the	historical	principle,	it	is	folly	to	think	that	this	continuity	is,	or	can	only	be,	at	the	level	of	mathematical	equations.	More	about	nature	can	be	known	than	mathematically	expressed	relations	among	magnitudes.			 Poincaré	was,	at	least	before	Perrin’s	work	on	the	Brownian	motion,	reluctant	to	accept	that	more	f	nature	can	be	known.	In	the	1900	address	we	referred	to	above,	he	illustrated	his	relationist	account	of	invariance	in	theory	change	by	referring	to	the	accommodation	of	Fresnel’s	laws	within	Maxwell’s	theory.	As	is	well-known,	Fresnel’s	laws	relating	the	amplitudes	of	reflected	rays	vis-à-vis	the	amplitudes	of	incident	rays	in	the	interface	of	two	media	were	retained	within	Maxwell’s	theory	of	electromagnetism,	although,	in	this	transition,	the	interpretation	of	the	amplitudes	changed	dramatically.	The	fact	of	retention	was	for	Poincare	evidence	that	Fresnel’s	theory	was	not	a	mere	“practical	recipe”	for	prediction.	More	specifically,	it	was	evidence	that	Fresnel	got	some	relational	facts	about	light	right,	where	these	facts	were	expressed	in	the	relevant	mathematical	equations.	Poincaré	(1900,	15)	noted:		 These	equations	express	relations,	and	if	the	equations	remain	true	it	is	because	these	relations	retain	their	reality.	They	teach	us,	now	as	then,	that	there	is	such	and	such	a	relation	between	some	thing	and	some	other	thing;	only	this	something	formerly	we	called	motion;	we	now	call	it	electric	current.	But	these	appellations	were	only	images	substituted	for	the	real	objects	which	nature	will	eternally	hide	from	us.		It	is	significant	to	note	that	for	Poincaré	the	order	of	dependence	between	the	worldly	relations	and	mathematical	equations	is	from	the	former	to	the	latter.	It	is	because	real	relations	remain	invariant	that	they	are	represented	by	invariant	
mathematical	equations	in	different	theories.	The	retention	of	mathematical	equations	in	theory-change	is	certainly	a	sign	for	an	underlying	invariant	natural	relation.	But	this	should	not	obscure	the	fact	that	the	invariance	of	the	equation	is	explained	by	the	invariance	of	the	natural	relation.			7.	But	is	it	right	to	say	that	only	relational	facts	about	light	got	retained	in	the	transition	from	Fresnel	to	Maxwell?	The	Fresnel	case	was	a	matter	of	national	pride	for	the	French.	Already	in	1895,	in	a	reply	to	Ostwald’s	“irresponsibly”	titled	essay,	Marie	Alfred	Cornu,	vice	president	of	l'Académie	des	Sciences,	emphatically	noted:			 Thus,	according	to	Mr.	Ostwald,	nothing	remains	of	the	work	of	Fresnel,	of	this	admirable	theory	of	the	light	waves,	the	influence	of	which	was	widespread	and	fecund	for	three	quarters	of	a	century	(1895,	1031).			The	readers	of	the	Revue	(which	was	partly	a	popular	journal),	Cornu	noted,	will	think	that	Fresnel’s	theory	was	“mediocre”	since	“it	was	buried	without	a	noise”	by	the	electromagnetic	theory.		
	 Cornu	went	on	to	point	out	that	Fresnel’s	law	was	still	alive	and	was	retained	in	Maxwell’s	theory	because	it	got	right	two	important	facts	about	light,	vis.	that	optical	vibrations	are	wave	propagations	and	that	this	propagation	is	transversal.	It	is	exactly	these	two	features	that	were	captured	by	Maxwell’s	‘electric	waves’	(cf.	1895,	1031).	This	is	something	that	I	too	argued	for	(independently	of	Cornu,	I	must	say)	in	my	(1995).	The	key	point,	I	think,	is	that	what	counts	is	invariance	in	theory-change	and	that	invariance	in	theory-change	is	not	merely	relational	or	structural.	Differently	put,	what’s	important	is	that	Fresnel	correctly	identified	some	properties	of	light	vis-à-vis	Maxwell’s	theory;	and	not	whether	these	properties	were	relational	or	not.			8.	Why,	one	might	wonder,	should	we	take	seriously	the	invariant	elements	in	theory-change?	What	do	they	tell	us	about	the	world	and	why?	Poincaré	was	fully	alive	to	this	problem	and	I	think	he	had	the	right	answer:	there	is	no	God’s	eye	point	of	view;	we	work	from	within	the	scientific	image	of	the	world	but	we	still	want	to	find	out	to	what	extent	it	has	latched	onto	the	world.	Tolstoy’s	argument	suggests	a	historical	reason	to	doubt	that	we	have	reason	to	believe	that	scientific	theories	have	latched	onto	the	world.	Invariance-in-theory-change	neutralizes	this	reason.	But	one	might	still	wonder:	why	should	we	think	that	
some	parts	of	the	theory	have	latched	onto	the	world	in	the	first	place?		In	his	reply	to	the	extreme	anti-realism	of	Eduard	LeRoy,	Poincaré	rightly	thought	that	the	right	attitude	towards	science	should	be	such	that	theories	are	taken	to	be	neither	dreams	nor	fictions	(1902,	290).	That	they	are	not	dreams	guards	against	idealism;	that	they	are	not	fictions	guards	against	fictionalism.	The	invariance-in-theory-change	separates	theories	from	dreams,	since	the	transmissiblity	of	theoretical	elements	that	survive	theory-change	guarantees	their	inter-subjectivity.	Still,	the	retained	parts	of	theories	could	fail	to	represent	anything	real;	they	could	be	fictions!	That’s	precisely	why	Poincaré	went	beyond	invariance	and	added	another	condition	to	his	defence	of	science.	I	have	called	it	
Correspondence	(though	I	do	not	want	it	to	be	confused	with	the	correspondence	theory	of	truth).	The	idea	is	that	the	elements	of	theories	which	survive	theory-
change	should	be	such	that	there	is	reason	to	think	that	they	have	latched	onto	reality.3	Though	I	will	not	argue	for	this	here	in	any	detail,	this	condition	of	correspondence	captures	an	early	version	of	the	so-called	‘no	miracles	argument’,	which	Poincaré	put	it	in	terms	of	how	unlikely	it	is	that	a	theory	is	radically	false	and	yet	it	yields	successful	predictions.	Science	makes	better	than	chance	predictions	(“the	scientist	is	less	mistaken	than	a	prophet	who	should	predict	at	random”)	and	this	suggests	that	science	“is	not	without	value	as	a	means	for	knowledge”	(1902,	265).		I	am	not	claiming	that	Poincaré	was	a	scientific	realist,	though,	as	I	noted	earlier,	he	progressively	became	more	convinced	of	the	reality	of	unobservable	entities	such	as	atoms	(see	my	2011;	also	Poincaré	1913,	90).	But	I	am	claiming	that	he	rightly	took	it	that	a	successful	defence	of	science	as	an	enterprise	which	delivers	at	least	some	knowledge	of	the	unobservable	world	requires	two	kinds	of	argument:	an	historical	argument	that	block’s	Tolstoy’s	argument;	and	a	conceptual	one,	linking	the	success	of	theories	especially	in	yielding	novel	prediction	to	their	having	in	some	sense	or	other	latched	onto	the	world.			9.	As	noted	already,	Poincaré,	at	least	initially,	thought	that	this	kind	of	conceptual	argument	warrants	only	the	conclusion	that	empirically	successful	theories	have	latched	onto	the	relational	structure	of	the	world.	We	saw	Cornu	making	the	point	(that	I	too	defended	extensively	in	my	1999,	chapter	7)	that	more	is	actually	warranted.	Boltzmann	too	made	the	same	point	in	a	rather	elegant	way.	Unlike	Poincaré,	Boltzmann	didn’t	live	long	enough	to	see	the	triumph	of	atomism	after	Perrin.	When	he	was	defending	atomism,	he	was	fully	aware	of	the	anomalies	that	the	atomic	hypothesis	faced	(e.g.,	the	specific	heats	anomaly);		and	he	was	also	aware	that	molecules	must	have	had	an	internal	structure.	So	he	knew	very	well	that	the	atomic	hypothesis	was	not	‘the	final	word’.	Yet,	as	he	stressed	in	his	(1906,	599),	the	atomic	conception	of	matter	has	given	“a	better	explanation	of	the	previously	known	facts,	it	inspired	new	experiments	and	permitted	the	prediction	of	unknown	phenomena”.	Besides,	it	has	provided	a	unified	framework	for	the	study	of	all	forms	of	matter	(cf.	1901a,	73	&	76).	These	might	not	be	conclusive	arguments	for	the	reality	of	atoms.	But	they	are	certainly	good	and	cogent	arguments.	Moreover,	they	suggest	the	right	kind	of	defence	of	a	realist	view	of	science:	in	defending	realism,	we	can	and	should	go	beyond	the	claim	of	invariance	in	theory-change	and	offer	some	positive	explanatory	reasons	for	taking	at	least	some	current	theories	as	not	being	radically	false.			10.	Let’s	go	back	to	where	we	started:	Tolstoy’s	argument.	Can	it	be	turned	into	a	positive	argument	for	realism?	Assume	there	is	no	privilege.	That’s	is	assume	(though	this	certainly	can	and	should	be	contested)	that	current	science	is	no	different	than	past	science	when	it	comes	to	methods	and	reliability.	Assume,	with	Poincaré,	that	“science	has	already	lived	long	enough	for	us	to	be	able	to	find	out	by	asking	its	history	whether	the	edifices	it	builds	stand	the	test	of	time,	or	whether	they	are	only	ephemeral	constructions”	(1902,	292).		It	is	certainly																																																									3	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	this,	see	my	(2014,	129-131).	
the	case,	as	both	Poincaré	and	Boltzmann	noted,	that	there	is	a	non-trivial	pattern	of	retention	in	theory-change:	elements	of	past	theories	have	been	retained	in	subsequent	theories	and	are	part	of	the	current	scientific	image.	We	may	conclude	then“by	analogy”,	using	Tolstoy’s	words,	that	“among	the	kinds	of	knowledge	occupying	the	attention	of	our	learned	men	[and	women]	and	called	science,	there	must	necessarily	be	some	which	will	be	regarded	by	our	descendants	much	as	we	now	regard”	atomism,	Newton’s	law	of	gravity,	Maxwell’s	equations,	Dalton’s	laws	and	many	other	components	of	past	theories	that	are	still	with	us	as	part	and	parcel	of	the	scientific	image.	This	is	an	optimistic	lesson	coming	from	the	history	of	theory-change	in	science.	It	might	be	modest,	but	robust	enough	to	be	realist.		11.	I	will	close	with	two	questions	that	Boltzmann	(1902,	256)	raised:			 Is	it	possible	that	the	conviction	will	ever	arise	that	certain	representations	are	per	se	exempt	from	displacement	by	simpler	and	more	comprehensive	ones,	that	they	are	‘true’?	Or	is	that	perhaps	the	best	conception	of	the	future,	to	imagine	something	of	which	one	has	absolutely	no	conception?		His	reply	was	modest:			 These	are,	indeed,	interesting	questions.	One	regrets	almost	that	one	must	pass	away	before	their	decision.	O	arrogant	mortal!	Thy	destiny	is	to	exult	in	the	contemplation	of	the	surging	conflict!			 Boltzmann	took	his	won	life	on	September	6,	1906.	A	few	years	later	the	“surging	conflict”	in	which	he	took	sides	in	favour	of	atomism	led	to	the	vindication	of	atomism.	He	did	not	live	to	see	it.	Still,	his	questions	remain	very	interesting.			
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